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COMMENT: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE EVENTS: LEGAL
RULES, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
AND CORPORATE CULTURE
Olufunmilayo B. Arewat
Commissioner Campos has focused our attention on what might be
termed corporate governance events. Such events may be seen as
episodes involving the failure of a company's corporate governance
process to address behaviors that may involve undesirable, unethical
or even fraudulent actions or activities. Understanding corporate
governance events requires attention to the actual behaviors underly-
ing such events both in terms of affirmative acts as well as acts of
omission, which in turn highlights the importance of education as one
tool to avert such events. Corporate governance events also entail
recognition of two distinguishable features of the settings in which
they take place. The first is broader and relates to the general busi-
ness environment in which such events occur. The second is more
particular and concerns the specific corporate cultural context where
such events unfold.
The episodes, often grouped within the rubric of corporate govern-
ance events, are by no means identical. A Google search for corpo-
rate governance events reveals a familiar list of names: Enron, World-
Coin, Conseco, Global Crossing and Tyco, and more recently Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Computer Associates and Disney. Such episodes
are also not limited to the United States, and a number of companies
based in Europe could be added to the above list, including ABB,
Vivendi, Parmalat and Shell. Although not identical, one commonal-
ity in a large majority of these cases relates to questionable, and in
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some cases even fraudulent, accounting practices. The fact that ac-
counting practices tie many of these episodes together is in large part
a result of the business environment of the late 1990s in which these
and other companies operated.
Corporate governance events from the late 1990s onwards have
taken place in the context of a changing business environment in
which intangibles such as information technology were increasingly
important forces. In fact, during the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury a transition has been apparent to what might be characterized as
an intangibles paradigm in which intangibles have been more and
more pervasive in business worldview and practice.1 This increase in
intangibles has been attributed to a number of factors, including in-
creased global competition and deregulation in the latter half of the
twentieth century, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s.2 These fac-
tors, combined with an upsurge in information and communication
technologies (ICTs), have contributed to the rise of intangibles.3 The
rising prevalence of intangibles has in many respects presented chal-
lenges to existing accounting and legal disclosure standards.
The corporate behaviors manifested in corporate governance
events must be evaluated within the context of this changing business
environment. This business environment is important because it re-
flects to some extent changing rules of the game that were an impor-
tant background element to corporate governance events. As Com-
missioner Campos has noted, new rules of the game often also present
new opportunities for fraud. This new paradigm has put pressure on
existing standards and rules, as is evident in accounting, for example.
As a result, the intangibles paradigm also can make transparency
more difficult to achieve; it can make measurement and verification
of accounting numbers more difficult, and it can challenge the ability
of companies to make adequate and accurate disclosures.4
The most obvious response to such corporate episodes would be to
change the rules that may have either failed to prevent or facilitated
their occurrence. This is an approach that is currently being applied.
As a result, one important consequence of the post-Enron regulatory
era has been changes in governance rules. For example, the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 20025 and other rules with respect to accounting
I Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Breaking Through the Intangibles Haze: Measuring and
(Mis)Representing Economic Reality under the Intangibles Paradigm, 45-56 (January 25, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
2 BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES, MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 9
(Brookings Institution Press 2001).
3 Id.
4 Arewa, supra note 1, at 56-65.
5 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (West Supp. 2002) [hereinafter,
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treatment of special purpose entities (SPEs),6 which increased the
minimum third-party interest from 3 percent to 10 percent to avoid
consolidation of the SPE, are two specific rule changes that came
about subsequent to and no doubt at least partly as a result of the cor-
porate governance events that occurred in and after the late 1990s.
Although it may be early to determine the effectiveness of these rule
changes, as Commissioner Campos has observed, rules really can
influence behavior. As a result, changes in rules that might lead to
greater board independence, separation of the CEO from the chair-
man, which is still under discussion in the U.S. and which remains
more typical in Britain than the U.S., and changes in the composition
of audit committees can make a difference in behavior. Further, such
rule changes may have an influence on outcomes with respect to po-
tential corporate governance events.
Although rule changes have the potential to influence behavior,
two points should be noted about the rule changes adopted in the
post-Enron context. In the first place, these rules do not and likely
cannot by their nature directly address many of the issues that arise
from the business context of the intangibles paradigm within which
these corporate events occurred. In addition, such rules do not neces-
sarily touch upon issues of internal corporate cultural context. Corpo-
rations often have discernible cultural styles and practices that form a
foundation that may encourage or discount particular types of behav-
iors. One example of corporate culture influencing behavior is Enron,
where what might be described as an aggressive, assertive and largely
unreflective corporate culture contributed to and facilitated fraud.7
Sarbanes-Oxley].
6 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, Emerging Issues Task Force Issue 90-15,
Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in Leasing
Transactions (Financial Accounting Research System CD-Rom, current through 1984) (setting
3 percent as the minimum third-party interest in an SPE to avoid consolidation of the SPE); see
also Bala G. Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in ENRON AND
BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND
SECURITIES ISSUES 103, 114-116 (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L. Ammons eds., CCH Incorpo-
rated 2002) (discussing changing consolidation rules for SPEs and noting that the 3 percent rule
was an ad-hoc solution intended as a short term band-aid that subsequently became standard
practice); Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised:
FASB Interpretation 46(R), THE CPA J., July 2004 at 30-37, available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2004/l04/essentials/p30.htm (examining the response of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to the development of sophisticated SPE transactions);
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, Interpretation No. 46(R) (Dec. 2003).
7 BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (Portfolio 2003). See also Ronald R.
Simms, & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More Than Codes), 45 J.
BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003) (discussing role of Enron corporate culture on the ethics of its employ-
ees).
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Such cultural factors play a role in the behaviors manifested in corpo-
rate governance events. Moreover, differences in cultural context
highlight the fact that similar rules may apply differently in varied
business environments and in the context of different internal proc-
esses and relationships that are in part a product of corporate culture.
Assessing corporate governance events reveals that behaviors of-
ten matter and that particular corporate responses to the changing
general business environment may depend on multiple interrelated
factors, many relating to what might be identified as features of cor-
porate culture, including the relationships and actions of the board of
directors within and with respect to the broader corporate culture.
The unhealthy distance mentioned by Commissioner Campos is rele-
vant here. This gap is characterized by an unhealthy distance be-
tween members of the board of directors and business decisions of the
public companies on whose boards they serve.
This unhealthy distance is partly a result of corporate cultural con-
text, but it is also a function of education, which is a related aspect of
this context. Good corporate governance is at least partially a learned
behavior. As a result, good corporate governance and best practices
may need to be relearned and revisited in different business environ-
ments and corporate cultural contexts.
The development of best practices can be considered in the context
of the intangibles paradigm. Under the intangibles paradigm, compa-
nies may relate to and use accounting in a different way. The wide-
spread and pervasive nature of intangibles and ICTs in the intangibles
paradigm business practice has clearly posed challenges for both ac-
counting rules and legal disclosure requirements. 8 As a result, in the
case of software companies, recognition of revenue may pose new
challenges to existing regulatory frameworks. These challenges may
be a reflection of both business environment and aspects of corporate
culture.
Business environment may influence accounting decisions by vir-
tue of the fact that existing rules may need to be adapted to the par-
ticular business environments such as those associated with the intan-
gibles paradigm. At the same time, corporate culture may also be
relevant in shaping how particular companies confront the challenges
that a particular business environment may pose. As a result, differ-
ent companies may respond quite differently to such challenges. In
the case of accounting revenues of a software company, the extent to
which a particular corporate culture fosters flexibility in confronting
questions that result from changes in the general business environ-
8 Arewa, supra note 1, at 56-65.
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ment can be important. Furthermore, this highlights the need to in-
corporate ongoing learning and reeducation in the face of new busi-
ness environments and challenges as a desirable core feature of cor-
porate culture.
The challenges that new business environments pose for legal and
accounting rules are thus partly an issue of education and ensuring the
broadest possible range of education as to the types of fraud and the
types of misrepresentations that might occur in this new environment
as well as taking practical steps to prevent activities and practices that
might lead to corporate governance events. Such education should
extend to actors within corporations as well as their gatekeepers and
regulators. Such education must also be informed by the realities of
the corporate cultures within which corporate governance events take
place and should also seek to influence behavioral outcomes.
In many respects, Enron has been a watershed from the perspective
of both legal and accounting issues. Prior to Enron, the consequences
of corporate governance failure did not represent a clear and present
danger to many actors in corporate contexts. For many, business fail-
ure was a much closer and pertinent concept, and intuitive under-
standing of the concept of business failure thus came rather easily to
most actors within corporate contexts. In contrast, the concept of a
business falling or ceasing to exist on account of corporate govern-
ance problems or failure was a much more distant reality. As Com-
missioner Campos has mentioned, however, executives being led off
in handcuffs contributed enormously to the ability of many to under-
stand the potential consequences of corporate governance failure and
likely has had a significant deterrence effect.
The post-Enron era represents an important opportunity for educa-
tion and relearning in the context of changing business environments
and varied corporate milieus. Understanding corporate governance
events thus can be transformed into a question of how to encourage
private enforcement of best practices by educating diverse groups and
constituencies within corporate contexts as to what constitutes best
practices within changing business environments as well as within the
context of different corporate cultures.9
9 See Denton Collins, Austin L. Reitenga & Juan Manuel Sanchez-Cuevas, Managerial
Consequences of Earnings Restatements (October 2004), available at
http://business.utsa.edu/departments/ acc/arc/papers/CR.Draft.pdf (looking at penalties given
to managers connected to earnings restatements); Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan & Michael S.
Wilkins, The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and
Management Turnover (August 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-471842 (noting the importance of private
penalties and enforcement of GAAP rules).
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Such education requires a continuing effort that reflects Commis-
sioner Campos's discussion of ethical education within corporate
contexts. Such education should focus on integrity and honesty and
the importance of good business practices in general as well as spe-
cific issues that might arise from consideration of the relevant busi-
ness environment and applicable cultural context. As part of this
education process, the distinction between structures and rules such as
Sarbanes-Oxley, which are often very important, and actual behavior,
must be noted. Any education effort must focus on helping actors
within corporate contexts understand that behavior as might be re-
flected in both questions asked and those not asked. Such questions
should be seen as important ways to assess and evaluate the impact
and application of pertinent rules. Furthermore, how individuals who
might be members of management or the board of directors actually
operate within the broader corporate culture is also very important.
Consequently, whether a company is run by an imperial CEO, how
the board relates to this CEO, whether the board questions a CEO, as
well as a myriad of other factors, are all issues of corporate cultural
context and behavior that have an impact and that must be considered
within the context of how to best effectuate a system of rules given
existing corporate culture and the general business environment. For
that reason, in addition to considering relevant rules and focusing on
actual behaviors, continuing education about corporate practices
should reflect an understanding of the significance of broader envi-
ronmental and contextual factors.
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